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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant Proimtu MMI, LLC ("Proimtu" or "Defendant") 
is seeking attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent H20 Environmental, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff'' or 
"H20") arguments in Appellant's Reply Brief in support of its asserted issues on 
appeal should be dismissed as untimely and only Plaintiff's arguments in response 
to Defendant's sole issue for cross-appeal should be reviewed. 
Plaintiff filed its Appellant's Brief (the "Brief') on November 4, 2016. Pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule ("I.A.R.") 34(c), Defendant filed its Cross-Appeal and Answering Brief of 
Defendant/Respondent ( the "Cross-Brief') on December 1, 2016, 1 within the 28-day deadline 
required for a combined response and cross-brief. I.A.R. 34( c) provides that a cross-
respondent's brief, if any, "shall be filed within 28 days after the cross-appellant's brief." 
Furthermore, "[a]ny reply brief shall be filed within 21 days after service of any respondent's 
brief." I.A.R. 34(c) (emphasis added). Appellant's Reply Brief (the "Reply Brief') was filed 
December 30, 2016. Although Plaintiff styled and titled the Reply Brief as a "reply" in support 
of the issues upon which it appeals, Plaintiff addresses both the issues of its own appeal as well 
as the issues on cross-appeal. Plaintiffs response to the issues in the Cross-Brief could arguably 
have been filed timely, and for purposes of this Reply Brief, Defendant will address Plaintiffs 
1 The Cross-Brief was dated and mailed December 1, 2016; however, the Court has listed the 
filing date as December 2, 2016. 
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However, Plaintiffs untimely arguments which are a reply in support of the Brief and the issues 
specific to its appeal should be stricken as untimely. The brief is styled as a reply despite the fact 
that Plaintiff mi-:-:r>:n its: rr>:ply dr>:::inlinr>: hy -:evr>:n (7) ii::iy-: ::inti ::i-:-:r>:rts ::irgnment-: in rr>:s:pon<::P: to 
Defendant's issue on cross-appeal. In the event the Court determines that such arguments are not 
to be stricken, Defendant responds to the substantive arguments below. 
II. Defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in 
Idaho. 
Even construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to establish that 
Defendant's conduct connects it to the forum in a meaningful way as is required for a finding of 
purposeful availment to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 
S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). Regardless of whether the facts are viewed in the light most favorable 
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff still has the burden of showing that Defendant purposefully availed itself of 
doing business in the forum and Plaintiff cannot and has not been able to meet that burden. See 
Menkem v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). 
First, Plaintiff claims that the District Court erred by not reviewing the totality of the 
alleged contacts with the forum. However, contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the District Court 
not only separately analyzed each alleged contact, but the District Court's analysis also reviews 
the alleged contacts as a whole, and the District Court correctly determined that Defendant did 
not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Idaho. R. Vol. 1, P. 
6 
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L case type 
of contact as a failure to review the alleged contacts in their totality. 
The contacts Plaintiff alleges as the evidentiary basis for its argument that Defendant had 
sufficient minimum contacts with Idaho (i.e., the signature line on Mr. Savre's email shmved a 
Boise address, the W-9 with a Boise address, Plaintiffs intent to use a Boise bank branch to 
process payroll, and mailed payroll information and funds which Plaintiff then processed and 
distributed through the Boise bank branch) are as a whole insufficient to establish that Defendant 
purposefully directed its activity to Idaho. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125; Rupert v. Bond, 68 
F.Supp.3d 1142, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 
2008); Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531,542 (D.N.J. 2002); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 
44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal 
Co., 558 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1977); Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 78, 
803 P .2d 978, 984 (1990) (the location of residence of an employee or agent of the company is 
purely fortuitous and not determinative of whether minimum contacts have been satisfied); see 
also Adv. Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d 796, 802-03 (2014); See e.g., LAK, Inc. v. 
Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990); 
Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988); Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon 
Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1987); Scullin Steel Co. v. Nat'! Ry. Utilization Corp., 
676 F.2d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1982); accord Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
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of sufficient minimum contacts by Defendant. The District Court determined that the alleged 
contacts were unilateral acts of Plaintiff. R. Vol. 1, P. 000154, L. 9-15. The case law cited by 
the District Court and the Cross-Brief is clear that these contacts are insufficient Walden, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1125; Rupert, 68 F.Supp.3d at 1168; Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28; 
Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 542; Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 729; Aaron Ferer & Sons 
Co., 558 F.2d at 455; see also Adv. Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 802-03; See e.g., 
LAK, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1300; Am. Greetings Corp., 839 F.2d at 1169; Kerry Steel, Inc., 106 F.3d 
at151; Scullin Steel Co., 676 F.2d at 314; accord Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50. 
Once again, Plaintiff tried to bolster its argument by citing to Southern Idaho Pipe & 
Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977). Plaintiffs 
argument appears to rely upon restating its argument in the Brief and ignoring Defendant's case 
law and argument in the Cross-Brief responding to Plaintiffs misguided arguments. As noted in 
the Cross-Brief, Plaintiffs entire argument rests upon Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co., a case 
involving a multitude of communications including contacts with more than one business in the 
state and affirmative solicitation via advertising circulars, not the vastly different alleged 
contacts based on unilateral acts of Plaintiff which occurred in this matter. 98 Idaho at 497, 
567 P.2d at 1248. Thus, the case is vastly different from the minimal interactions and 
communications Plaintiff alleges in this lawsuit and cannot support Plaintiffs argument. 
The unilateral activities of a plaintiff are irrelevant under a personal jurisdiction analysis. 
Phillips, 530 F.2d at 28 (requiring that a defendant's contacts "must be deliberate, and 'not based 
8 
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510 (1st 
Cir. 2007)). Plaintiffs signature line of its own email, along with its choices of business 
location, bank branch to process payroll, and location to process mailed payroll information and 
distribute funds are all unilateral acts of Plaintiff ,md carn1ot establish personal jurisdiction over 
the Defendant. 
Mere knowledge of such information is not enough to create minimum contacts as 
discussed above and does not transmute the unilateral acts of one party into the unilateral acts of 
the party that merely has information of the other party's location and actions. Walden, 134 
S.Ct. at 1125; see also Phillips, 530 F.3d at 28. Plaintiff has not and cannot show specific acts 
that Defendant undertook which constitute sufficient minimum contact with Idaho. Plaintiff's 
rhetoric and argument solely alleges the same alleged contacts throughout this litigation in its 
failed motion practice which have been shown to be insufficient. See Reply Brief, at 4, 6. 
Third, Plaintiff's argument that the minor contacts in which Defendant participated 
somehow imbue Defendant's mere potential knowledge of Plaintiff's location with greater 
import sufficient to establish minimum contacts is misguided. Plaintiff has not provided any 
case law which indicates that the actions which it alleges constitute minimum contacts (i.e., the 
signature line on Mr. Savre's email showed a Boise address, the W-9 with a Boise address, 
Plaintiff's intent to use a Boise bank branch to process payroll, and mailed payroll information 
and funds which Plaintiff then processed and distributed through the Boise bank branch) is 
sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction. In fact, Plaintiff urges the Court to reject the case law 
finding that mere knowledge is insufficient because of the other insufficient unilateral actions of 
9 
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Reply not err in 
following established case law that determined mere knowledge is insufficient, unilateral 
activities of the Plaintiff are irrelevant (a point which Plaintiff has not disputed), minor emails 
and phone calls are insufficient, and intermittent correspondence is insufficient under a personal 
jurisdiction analysis to subject a defendant to a foreign forum. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125; 
Rupert, 68 F.Supp.3d at 1168; Phillips., 530 F.3d at 28; Machulsky, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 542; 
Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 729; Houghland Farms, Inc., 119 Idaho at 78, 803 P.2d at 984; Aaron 
Ferer & Sons Co., 558 F.2d at 455; see also Adv. Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 802-
03; See e.g., LAK, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1300; Am. Greetings Corp., 839 F.2d at 1169; Kerry Steel, 
Inc., 106 F.3d at 151; Scullin Steel Co., 676 F.2d at 314; accord Harlow, 432 F.3d 50. 
Notably, Plaintiff fails to address or even respond to Defendant's argument and case law 
regarding the District Court's appropriate action in determining that Defendant did not submit to 
the jurisdiction of Idaho by filing its Statement of Costs and Fees. Thus, Plaintiff has abandoned 
its erroneous argument from its Brief and the issue need not be addressed in Defendant's Reply 
Brief. 
III. The analysis of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, while not 
required in this litigation, necessitate that the dispute be litigated in Nevada. 
Plaintiffs claim in its untimely Reply Brief that Defendant did not address H20's 
arguments and authority regarding whether personal jurisdiction comports with traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice ironically ignores its own lack of discussion of the 
topic and Defendant's comprehensive argument in the Cross-Brief. Plaintiffs own treatment of 
10 
12503853. l 
to two sentences Plaintiff 
acknowledges that the prong exists and that if Plaintiff meets its burden in proving the first 
prong, the burden to defend against the second prong shifts to Defendant. See Brief, at 10. 
in the Brief. See Cross-Brief, at 16. 
First, Plaintiff's own authority in the Brief acknowledges that any burden to show that the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice is only 
triggered if Plaintiff first satisfies the burden of showing that Defendant purposefully availed 
itself of Idaho jurisdiction. See Brief, at 1 O; Menkem, 503 F.3d at 1057 (9th Cir. 2007); Ballard 
v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (1995) (citation omitted). The District Court determined that 
Plaintiff did not meet this burden and neither the Brief nor the Reply Brief provide adequate 
argument that such a burden has been met. Indeed they cannot, because as articulated in the 
Cross-Brief and above, Plaintiff is unable to meet this burden with the paltry acts it alleges 
somehow in totality equate to purposeful availment. 
Second, Defendant addressed Plaintiff's two sentences of text on the topic in the Cross-
Brief by delineating the reasons why Plaintiff failed to meet the first prong. The majority of the 
Cross-Brief is devoted to just this issue as is the argument above. 
Third, Defendant's argument is not an attempt to circumvent the second prong analysis, 
but merely a response based on the case law presented by Plaintiff that such analysis was not 
required upon a finding by the District Court that purposeful availment does not exist in this 
case. 
11 
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the 
and substantial justice here, as the District Court correctly found. Despite Plaintiff's wishful 
thinking and careful manipulation of facts in the Brief and the Reply Brief, this dispute is 
bet~?1een t\VO 1'Je,1ada companies in\101"·ving the salaries of Nev1ada construction vvorkers vvho 
worked on a solar plant in Nevada. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a party when the 
dispute is based upon contracts that were not intended to be performed within the purported 
forum state and without a substantial connection to the purported forum state offends traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 558 F.2d at 450. The 
District Court made a clear finding of fact that the Parties dispute involves a contract for Plaintiff 
"to hire and employ Nevada-based construction laborers for a solar project in Tonopah, Nevada." 
R. Vol. 1, P. 000151, L. 24-26. Plaintiff cannot circumvent this finding by now claiming that in 
contradiction to the District Court's Order that the contract involved a payroll contract to be 
performed in Idaho as argued in its Reply Brief. See Reply Brief, at 8. Plaintiff's business 
location and its unilateral choice of location to pre-screen Nevada construction workers 
performing work in Nevada is insufficient to convert a contract involving the payment and use of 
Nevada workers in Nevada to perform a Nevada contract into a contract to be performed in 
Idaho. 
Traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice, while an unnecessary analysis 
given Plaintiff's failure to meet its burden of showing purposeful availment, necessitate that any 
litigation involving the dispute take place in Nevada where the parties and the center of the 
dispute are located. 
12 
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Reasonable Attorneys' 
Defendant Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(1). 
Costs to 
Plaintiffs Reply Brief overlooks the mandatory nature of an award of attorneys' fees 
under Idaho Code §12-120. Instead, Plaintiff's Reply Brief focuses on Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54 ("Rule 54") and fails to even mention Idaho Code § 12-120. Plaintiff does not 
independently cite to any case law and cites solely to an excerpt of the District Court's Order and 
Rule 54. 
The Statement of Costs was filed pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1) mandating that 
"[i]n any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there 
shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees." Idaho Code § 12-120(1) does not specify 
that a specific manner or form of filing or that a separate attorney fee application be filed, but 
rather requires the court to fix a reasonable amount as attorneys' fees "as part of the costs of the 
action." 
The case law cited by the District Court includes one case in which the court issued an 
award pursuant to the mandatory requirement to do so under Idaho Code § 12-120(1), despite 
some disagreement over the amount to be awarded, and another case in which the analysis is 
solely based upon Rule 54 and the discretionary Idaho Code § 12-121 and does not include a 
request for fees as part of the costs of the action under Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ). See Medical 
Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 109, 175 P.3d 795, 798 (App. 2007); Hackett v. 
Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 262-63, 706 P.2d 1372, 1373-74 (App. 1985). Idaho Code§ 12-120(1) 
13 
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is not and the as should to amount award, 
not whether to award attorneys' fees. Compare I.C. § 12-120(1) with I.C. § 12-121. 
In addition, Rule 54 case law does not require that the party seeking fees provide all of 
the information for the factors under a Rule 54 analysis to detennine the amount of fees awarded. 
See Hackett, 109 Idaho at 264, 706 P.2d at 1375. Indeed, some of the information to determine 
the amount of the mandatory award "may come from the court's own knowledge and 
experience" and "some may come from the record of the case," while some information may be 
within the sole control of the attorney of the party requesting the fees. Id. However, this is not 
an action in which the party requesting a specified amount of fees as costs supplied absolutely no 
information. Defendant filed a Statement of Costs thereby providing the statutorily sufficient 
required information. 
Plaintiff misinterprets the law when it claims that Defendant did not meet its burden for 
an award of attorneys' fees, as there is no burden required for a mandatory award of fees. The 
District Court did not have discretion under Idaho Code § 12-120(1) to decide not to award fees 
as costs. Thus, the District Court erred in denying reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(1). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Defendant requests that the Court deny Plaintiff's Appeal and 
grant Defendant's Cross-Appeal reversing the District Court's improper denial of attorneys' fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 2017. 
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